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ments are bad, and therefore believe mass movements are futile. The mid-
dle class are more sanguine about the prospect of good government, and
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The middle class in modern societies often cause political ferment and spearhead
mass movements against the status quo. The protests in Brazil, Bulgaria, and Turkey
in 2013 provide the most recent examples of such political unrest. Although these
protests occurred for distinct reasons in each country, the common fundamental strength
of the demonstrations came from the involvement of the middle class.1 The phe-
nomenon whereby the middle classes take collective action and demand political changes
is anything but new in history. For example, the 1987 demonstrations against Chun
Doo-hwan in South Korea were initiated mostly by the urban middle class.2 More
generally, in what is called the “third wave” of democratization that occurred between
the 1970s and the early 1990s, the most active participants were middle class, while the
rich, the peasants, and even the industrial workers remained relatively inactive or in-
different (Huntington, 1993). The World Values Survey provides some evidence that
confirms this well-known hump-shaped relationship between participation in politi-
cal collective actions and the social class of the participants. Specifically, the lower and
upper classes are significantly less likely to participate in demonstrations than those
in the middle social strata.3
This phenomenon is often referred to as “middle class activism,” i.e., the middle
classes are among the most active strata in society to exert pressure on governments
by participating in collective action, such as demonstrations, protests, or even revo-
lutions. The purpose of this mass action is not necessarily to bring down the gov-
ernment. Rather, the common theme is a demand for reform and a higher quality of
governance, such as better public services and less corruption.
It is interesting that the middle class, typically considered the keystone of stabil-
ity in a modern polity, often spearhead social movements. Compared with the middle
1The demonstrations in Turkey grew from a protest against plans for a construction project. An
increase in public transport prices triggered the protests in Brazil. Government corruption and crony-
ism set off the protests in Bulgaria. See “Middle-class rage sparks protest movement in Turkey, Brazil,
Bulgaria and beyond,” Washington Post, June 29, 2013.
2See “What happens when tear gas meets the middle class in Seoul?” The Economist, June 20, 1987.
3The survey asks respondents whether they have participated in demonstrations in the past, and to
which social class they belong. We compute the fraction of participants in each class, after controlling
for the demographic characteristics of the respondents, using the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the
World Values Survey, which cover 78 countries from 1994 to 2007.
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class, the rich have little incentive to upset the political system because they are its ben-
eficiaries. However, why are the poor less active than the middle class? If anything,
they should be more dissatisfied with the current regime than the middle class are,
and their opportunity costs of taking action are lower. This puzzling fact of the poor
being politically passive has long been known and documented by political scientists
such as Huntington (1968). Berry et al. (1991) also find that political involvement is
highly correlated with social class, and that the poor, who need help the most, make
the least demands of government. Hoffer (1951) observes that the poor “are not hos-
pitable to change. [. . .] There is thus a conservatism of the destitute as profound as the
conservatism of the privileged, and the former is as much a factor in the perpetuation
of a social order as the latter.” These scholars typically take the passivity of the poor
as a behavioral or psychological trait.
In this paper, we seek to provide a rational explanation for why the poor are more
“pessimistic” than the middle class. The key is that mass political action is driven as
much by hope as it is by discontent. To illustrate this idea, we assume in the bench-
mark model that the outcome of regime change is uncertain and that people may adopt
two contrasting world views about it.4 Under the hopeful view, governments can be a
force for good. The quality of governance is potentially high, even though the qual-
ity of the existing regime may not be high. Under the pessimistic view, the quality of
governance is low in general, regardless of who is in power. If the existing regime
is unsatisfactory, collective action—even when it succeeds—does not help that much
because it merely replaces one set of corrupt leaders or inefficient policies with an-
other. Individuals assess the plausibility of these two world views based on their own
personal experiences. The poor believe that the quality of the current regime is low.
Because the quality of the current regime is an indicator of the quality of governance
in general, the poor also rationally give more weight to the pessimistic world view.
In contrast, the middle class attach greater weight to the hopeful world view. Even
though they do think that the existing government is of low quality (but not as bad as
4Section 3.1 offers a generalized version of this model, where we do not restrict the number of the
world views and allow for a continuum of descriptions of how the world works.
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the poor believe it is), they are still optimistic that governance can be improved if the
current leaders or their policies are replaced.
We embed this mechanism in a regime change framework in which heterogeneous
citizens decide whether to participate in a mass protest or not, and the regime is re-
placed (or reforms implemented) if the number of participants is sufficiently high.5
Strategic complementarities imply that people are more likely to participate in protests
if they estimate that the current economic conditions support a large number of hope-
ful individuals who are willing to revolt. Interestingly, the poor and the middle class
differ in their assessments of the probability of success. This is because people make
inferences about economic conditions based on their own experiences and they believe
that most of their fellow citizens are in a similar situation as theirs. Citizens at the bot-
tom of society tend to underestimate the crowd of revolters, because they believe that
most people are as pessimistic as they are.
In equilibrium, the poor do not participate because they not only hold a pessimistic
view about the outcome of regime change, but also they consider the chances of suc-
cess to be rather slim. The rich refrain from participating because they consider regime
change, and the potential re-shuffling of economic status associated with it, undesir-
able. The middle class, who see the possibility of better governance and are optimistic
about the chances of success, form the core participants of mass movements. There-
fore, this model does not admit the standard monotone equilibrium in regime change
models featuring coordination. Instead, the decision to participate in collective action
is non-monotone in economic status; we label it an interval equilibrium.
In Section 2, we develop an approach for establishing the existence of interval equi-
librium and characterizing equilibrium multiplicity and comparative statics. In Sec-
tion 3, we show that the same approach can be extended to characterize equilibria
when citizens differ in multiple dimensions.
5The regime change framework with a continuum of agents is particularly useful for understanding
mass political action. A distinctive feature of the protests that we describe is that they are not organised
by unions or other established political or interest groups, but are mostly spontaneous and leaderless.
See, for example, “The march of protest,” The Economist, June 29, 2013.
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The mechanism of model uncertainty that drives the coordination of collective ac-
tion in our model adds to the existing economics literature on regime change. To
demonstrate its empirical relevance, we provide some evidence in Section 4 to show
that the poor are indeed more pessimistic about politics in general, and that more pes-
simistic individuals are less likely to participate in mass political action. Further, in
our model, it is important that individuals estimate the likelihood of success by mak-
ing inferences about the distribution of the population. They make such inferences
based on their own experiences, which naturally lead to the so-called “towards the
median bias,” i.e., agents tend to believe that they are closer to the median than they
actually are. In Section 4, we provide some evidence to corroborate this mechanism.
We do not claim that our theory is the only one that can explain middle class ac-
tivism, given that it is an inherently multifaceted issue. In the literature, there exist
various popular and plausible hypotheses about mass movements, which shed light
on the different characteristics of middle class activism, such as modernization the-
ory, economic interest, the education hypothesis, and several behavioral explanations.
In Section 5, we discuss the differences between our new hypothesis and the existing
ones and highlight our contribution to the literature.
Three types of uncertainty exist in our regime change model: fundamental uncer-
tainty (i.e., the underlying quality of the regime), payoff uncertainty (i.e., the benefit
from participating), and model uncertainty (i.e., the description of how the world op-
erates). The first two and their role in coordination games have been studied exten-
sively in the literature. In Morris and Shin (1998) and later studies, such as Chen et al.
(2014) and Edmond (2013), agents are uncertain about the fundamental strength of the
regime. In Bueno de Mesquita (2010) and Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011), agents are
uncertain about the benefits of participating in collective action. One important dif-
ference between the two types of stochastic structure is that the former features two-
sided limit dominance, whereas the latter induces one-sided limit dominance (Bueno
de Mesquita, 2011). Our work adds to the existing literature by introducing model
uncertainty, such that agents are uncertain about the structure of the game. By inter-
4
acting with the two other types of uncertainty, model uncertainty induces one-sided
limit dominance and leads to the possibility of interval equilibria in this model.
Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2010) show that non-monotone equilibria can exist with-
out two-sided limit dominance in a two-player coordination game with uncertain pay-
offs. In their work, they tackle three analytical challenges, i.e., non-monotone expected
net payoff to participation, the absence of global strategic complementarities, and the
presence of one-sided limit dominance. Both monotone and interval equilibria can ex-
ist in their model and they show the existence of non-monotone equilibrium by using
the variation diminishing property. In our model, both model uncertainty and pay-
off uncertainty are present. However, the former is the driving force for our results,
without which one-sided limit dominance does not obtain.6 Similar to Shadmehr and
Bernhardt (2010), the expected net payoff for participation is not monotone in the type
of agents; but unlike their model, strategic complementarities still remain. Monotone
equilibria do not exist, but we can characterize the existence and multiplicity of non-
monotone equilibria and their rankings by using lattice-theoretical methods (Vives,
1990).7
It has been shown that multiple equilibria can arise both in global game models
(e.g., Angeletos et al. 2007) and in settings with uncertain payoffs (e.g., Bueno de
Mesquita, 2010; Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2011). One common feature of these mod-
els is that the net benefit of actions for the marginal attacker crosses zero more than
once. That feature gives rise to the equilibrium multiplicity, but the decision rule still
remains monotone. In our model, the net benefit of taking action for any individual
citizen crosses zero twice, which leads to an interval decision rule. We elaborate on
why multiple interval equilibria exist in our model in Section 2.3.
The formulation of model uncertainty is related to that in Meirowitz and Tucker
6In our model, there exists no state in which the dominant strategy for some agents is to attack the
regime.
7Note that it is not implied that model uncertainty necessarily leads to one-sided dominance or non-
monotone equilibrium. Chen and Suen (2014) construct a dynamic global game model to study why
crises that are rare tend to be contagious. In that model, both model uncertainty and fundamental
uncertainty are present, but it still features two-sided limit dominance, as well as unique monotone
equilibrium.
5
(2013), in which citizens observe the performance of the existing government and
make inferences not only about the quality of this particular government, but also
about the pool of governments in general. Our work differs in two key aspects. First,
their model abstracts from coordination concerns among citizens, which is the focus of
our analysis. Second, they study a model with homogenous citizens, whereas agents
are heterogeneous in our model. Based on their own circumstances, the agents have
different observations or interpretations of the performance of the existing govern-
ment. Therefore, they make different assessments about the same government and
about how the world operates in general, which leads to different participation deci-
sions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 1, we present the
benchmark model and discuss in detail the three types of uncertainty. In Section 2, we
characterize interval equilibria and develop a method for establishing existence, multi-
plicity and comparative statics. In Section 3, we generalize and extend our benchmark
model and further demonstrate that our key results still survive in more general en-
vironments. In Section 4, we provide evidence for the new mechanisms characterized
in our model. In Section 5, we offer broader interpretations of our model insights and
highlight the differences of our theory from the existing hypotheses in the literature.
The last section outlines the possible directions for extending our theory.
1. The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The well-
being or income of agent i is xi. We assume that it is log-normally distributed, so that
it is non-negative. Denote yi ≡ log xi, and let yi = θ + ei. The first component θ rep-
resents a regime-related aggregate factor that affects citizens’ welfare.8 Nature selects
it from a normal distribution N(M, σ2θ ). The second component ei is idiosyncratic and
8For example, a well-managed economy with growth friendly policies is characterized by a high
θ, whereas a badly-managed economy with severe market distortions and resource misallocation is
characterized by a low θ.
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regime-independent, which is drawn from another normal distribution N(0, σ2e ).9 Cit-
izens only observe their own income xi, which represents their own life experiences
but not the regime quality θ.10
Each citizen i chooses to participate in collective action (ai = 1) or not (ai = 0).
The aggregate mass of the population that joins the protest is A =
∫ 1
0 ai di. If the
mass of participants exceeds the threshold T ∈ (0, 1), the regime will be replaced by a
new one or new reform policies will be implemented; otherwise, the existing regime
survives. A citizen incurs a positive cost c if he participates. The perceived payoff from
participation depends on whether the regime survives, on whether he participates,
and on the operation of the world.
There are two alternative models of how the world works. Under the hopeful world
view, social movements can make a positive difference. This view holds that the qual-
ity of governance is potentially high, even though the quality of the existing regime may
not be high. Therefore, when the current regime is not satisfactory, collective action
or pressure from society can either push the government to reform itself and improve
its quality, or replace the existing regime with a better one. The hopeful world view
can be captured by two assumptions. On the aggregate level, if success is achieved,
the replacement is another independent draw θ′ from the distribution N(M, σ2θ ), with
M = mH.11 On the individual level, the welfare consequence for agents is that they
can experience a “re-shuffling” of economic status in the new society, as a byproduct
of regime change. Specifically, with some probability, citizens can “start a new chap-
9This normality assumption is made so that the distribution of income in this economy is single-
peaked, which captures one of the key features of modern middle class societies. This model may
not be applicable to rural societies where most of the population is poor farmers. Further, yi can be
interpreted as “status” in society. For the worst-off agents with yi going to minus infinity, their welfare
or income is still bounded, which prevents agents at the bottom of society from obtaining an infinite
gain from participating in mass movements.
10In the benchmark model, we only consider two relevant determinants of income. In reality, personal
characteristics such as cognitive skills, human capital and education can also affect one’s economic
status. In Section 3.2, we explicitly characterize such a case by allowing for this additional determinant
and show that the key qualitative results continue to hold. Further, implicitly, we assume that agents do
not observe θ and therefore do not have sufficient knowledge about the income distribution. In Section
4, we offer some direct evidence that justifies this assumption and discusses why it is the case in reality.
11Note that θ′ can be either higher or lower than θ. A higher θ′ implies that the quality of the regime
improves once the old one is replaced. If θ′ is lower, then the mass action is successful but the quality
of the new regime is even worse.
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Table 1. Payoffs under the Hopeful World View
A ≥ T A < T
ai = 0 p0x′i + (1− p0)xi xi
ai = 1 p1x′i + (1− p1)xi − c xi − c
ter in life,” and obtain a new status x′i, where log x
′
i = θ
′ + e′i. This probability is p1
for participants, and p0 < p1 for bystanders.12 If the current regime survives, there
will be no re-shuffling in society. The payoffs to agent i under the hopeful view are
summarized in Table 1.
There is also a pessimistic world view, which holds that governments do not do any
good regardless of who is in power. If the existing regime is unsatisfactory, changing
it would merely replace one set of corrupt leaders or inefficient policies with another.
According to this world view, society is in the grip of vested interests, which results
in a low quality of governance, and efforts to improve it by the masses are in vain.
Specifically, we assume that in this pessimistic world, M = mL < mH; and that the
quality of the regime cannot be improved by social movements and there is no re-
shuffling opportunity open to society. In other words, according to this view, mass
movements are valueless for both society and individuals.
Several aspects of our assumptions on the two world views merit further com-
ment. First, in this model, the purpose of collective action is to remove the status
quo, in the hope of a better replacement. The random reshuffling mechanism, which
is assumed to follow a successful revolution in the hopeful world, is a byproduct of
regime change. For example, policies pursued by the new government may affect the
economic opportunities of individuals, even though they are not in direct contact with
the previous government. However, we stress that this reshuffling assumption is made
only for the purpose of realism and can be relaxed in a more general environment (see
Section 3.1).
12In a model with a continuum of agents, agents have no incentive to participate if p1 = p0. The
assumption that p1 > p0 reflects that individuals care about the collective outcome and their personal
role in bringing about the outcome, so that the free-riding problem does not completely eliminate par-
ticipation.
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Second, regarding the pessimistic world, we assume that the average regime qual-
ity is lower and that a change of government does not help at either the aggregate or
individual levels. Note that both can be joint consequences of corrupt politics. In such
a corrupt world, the government is tightly controlled by a group of elites. Specifically,
one particular leader may be ousted, because of internal political fighting or pressure
from the public, but the successor is still selected from the same group of elites or they
are powerful enough to assimilate anyone who assumes office. This elite-manipulated
government prefers implementing policies favorable to the interests of the elite, which
may distort the allocation of resources and prevent the economy from operating in an
efficient manner. The policies are implemented at the expense of the economic inter-
ests of the vast majority of the population.
We stress that the key characteristic of the pessimistic world is that the average
regime quality is lower than that in the hopeful world. The assumption that the regime
quality cannot be changed even upon success simplifies the baseline model but is not
crucial for our key results. In Section 3.1, we offer a generalized model in which a new
regime quality is drawn following a successful collective action.
Third, note that neither of the two alternative views is necessarily correct in gen-
eral, and that this type of uncertainty cannot be easily resolved for a particular country.
The popularity of both world views in reality and in the literature lends support to this
observation.13 Therefore, it is realistic to assume that people are uncertain about which
view is the true description of how the world works.
Finally, the participation decision of the rich is simplified in both worlds, given
that the key question in this paper concerns the contrast between the passivity of the
poor and activism of the middle class and its explanation. Our model is reasonable for
studying mass movements in which individuals take to the street to protest against
the regime. In these events the rich rarely show up for various reasons, but we simply
model them as beneficiaries of the existing regime, who do not want to upset it.14
13For example, Meirowitz and Tucker (2013) argue that citizens may not be sure about the quality of
the pool of governments, especially in young democracies.
14Specifically, in the benchmark case, the benefit of participating relative to standing by is negative
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2. Equilibrium Analysis
2.1. The equilibrium
In this model, three types of uncertainty matter for the decisions of individuals: model
uncertainty, fundamental uncertainty, and payoff uncertainty. First, agents are not
certain about the true model of the world. We assume that they attach a common
prior probability α0 that the hopeful view is true. Based on their personal experience,
they rationally update their beliefs about the two world views. Since yi = θ+ ei and θ
is drawn either from N(mH, σ2θ ) under the hopeful view or from N(mL, σ
2
θ ) under the
pessimistic view, the relative likelihood of observing yi given these two world views is
φ((yi−mH)/σy)/φ((yi−mL)/σy), where φ(·) is the standard normal density function
and σ2y ≡ σ2θ + σ2e . Therefore, by Bayes’ rule, the updated probability of the hopeful
world for agent i is:
α(yi) =
α0φ((yi −mH)/σy)
α0φ((yi −mH)/σy) + (1− α0)φ((yi −mL)/σy) . (1)
Second, the underlying regime quality θ is unknown to the citizens. Since θ affects
the distribution of yi in the population, it determines the total size of participants in
the collective action, and hence its eventual success or failure. Because each agent
forms a belief about the underlying regime quality based on his own life experience,
each agent also attaches a different probability that the collective action will succeed.
We let
pi(yi) = Pr[A(θ) ≥ T | yi, H] (2)
represent the probability that the current regime collapses on the condition that the
hopeful world view is the true description and the status index is yi. This probability
depends on the equilibrium decision rule adopted by agents in the economy.
for the rich in this model, despite of coordination concerns. As a result, they have a dominant strategy
of not participating. But this assumption is not essential for our main results and it can be generalized
such that the benefit can be positive for the rich.
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Third, the payoff reward from the new society is also not certain. Conditional
on the hopeful view, success will lead to a new regime quality, which can be better
or worse, and the re-shuffling of status following success implies both upward and
downward possibilities for the agents. The expected gain from participation relative
to standing by for agent i is:
ρ(yi) = (p1 − p0)E[eθ′+e′i − eyi | yi, H] = (p1 − p0)(eyˆ − eyi), (3)
where yˆ ≡ mH + σ2y /2.15 When the free-riding problem is severe (p1− p0 is small), the
reward from successful mass action for an individual is diminished. Note that ρ(yi)
may be positive or negative, depending on whether yi is less than or greater than yˆ.16
Equilibrium in this model is characterized by a participation set Y∗ and a success set
Θ∗, such that agent i participates if and only if yi ∈ Y∗, and the collective action is
successful if and only if θ ∈ Θ∗. Since an agent participates in mass action when the
expected benefit exceeds the cost, we require that for any yi ∈ Y∗,
B(yi;Θ∗) ≡ α(yi)pi(yi;Θ∗)ρ(yi) ≥ c. (4)
Since the mass action is successful when the size of participants exceeds T, we require
that for any θ ∈ Θ∗,
A(θ; Y∗) =
∫
yi∈Y∗
φ
(
yi − θ
σe
)
1
σe
dyi ≥ T. (5)
15In this model, ρ(yi) is bounded from above when yi goes to minus infinity. This feature is the
consequence of our assumption that income is log-normally distributed (and therefore bounded above
zero). Intuitively, this formulation prevents agents at the bottom of society from obtaining an infinite
gain from participating in social movements.
16In the benchmark model, the expected benefit for agents with yi > yˆ is negative and they have
a dominant strategy of not participating. In Section 3.1, we provide an extended model in which the
expected benefit from participation is positive for all agents.
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2.2. The existence of interval equilibria
In this model, the expected reward ρ(yi) from successful mass action is decreasing in
yi. The rich find the potential re-shuffling in a new social order costly and have no
incentive to upset the existing regime. Indeed, for any agent with yi > yˆ, ρ(yi) is
strictly negative, so he never participates. In contrast, poorer individuals desire social
mobility and have relatively little to lose, therefore they are the natural candidates to
participate. We say that there is a monotone equilibrium if agents adopt a monotone
decision rule; i.e., the equilibrium participation set Y∗ takes the form of (−∞, y], for
some finite y.
If there were no model uncertainty (i.e., everyone adopts the hopeful world view),
it would be easy to see how a monotone equilibrium arises as an equilibrium outcome
of this model. For any agent, the estimated chance of success pi(yi) depends on the
equilibrium construction. Consider a standard construction as follows. Agents par-
ticipate when yi is below a threshold y. As a result of this decision rule, the mass of
participants decreases in θ. Thus, the regime is replaced if the regime quality θ is lower
than a threshold θ. The poor believe that the regime quality is low, that a large frac-
tion of the population also believe so, and that the mass of protesters must be high.
This implies that both pi(yi) and ρ(yi) are higher for poorer agents, which supports a
monotone decision rule. However, this conclusion does not hold when we incorporate
model uncertainty into the analysis.
PROPOSITION 1. Monotone equilibrium does not exist in this model.
Proof. From equation (1), we have limyi→−∞ α(yi) = 0, whereas both pi(yi) and ρ(yi)
are bounded above. Therefore, for yi sufficiently low, B(yi) < c, which violates condi-
tion (4).
Individuals in this model make two inferences based on yi. They need to form
expectations about the quality of the existing regime θ, and the quality of governance
in general, which is captured by the mean M of the distribution from which θ is drawn.
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Sufficiently poor agents infer that the current regime is bad (i.e., θ is low), but they also
infer that all governments are bad (i.e., M is low). The extreme pessimism of the very
poor accounts for the failure to obtain a monotone equilibrium in this model. This
mechanism is consistent with the classical view of Huntington (1968), who points out
that the poor in underdeveloped countries “do not seriously expect their government
to do anything to alleviate the situation.” We provide some further evidence that the
poor do, indeed, take a pessimistic view of governance in general in Section 4.
Generally, α(yi) is increasing in yi, that is, better-off agents are more hopeful. This
follows from the fact that the ratio of the likelihood of observing yi in the hopeful
world relative to that in the pessimistic world, φ((yi − mH)/σy)/φ((yi − mL)/σy), is
increasing in yi. Compared with the poor, the middle classes are less dissatisfied with
the present government because they believe that θ is not as low as that perceived by
the poor. Therefore, they are more hopeful, i.e., middle class citizens tend to believe
that they live in a world where their situation can be changed for the better through
collective action because the average regime quality M is likely high.
Since we have shown that individuals who are very poor or very rich do not partic-
ipate in collective action, we look for interval equilibria, in which Y∗ takes the form of
[y, y], for finite y ≤ y. A special case is a degenerate interval equilibrium, in which no one
participates. This corresponds to the case y = y, which we can represent by Y∗ = ∅.
For any interval participation set Y = [y, y], the mass of participants A(θ; Y) is
hump-shaped in θ. When θ is low, most individuals have low yi; and when θ is high,
most individuals have high yi. In either case, the mass of agents with intermediate
values of yi is small. Let Φ(·) represent the cumulative standard normal distribution
function. We have
A(θ; Y) = Φ
(
y− θ
σe
)
−Φ
(y− θ
σe
)
.
This function reaches a maximum at θ = (y + y)/2, and is strictly decreasing toward
0 as θ goes to positive or negative infinity. Thus, the set of θ for which A(θ; Y) ≥ T is
either empty (if T is high) or an interval, [θ, θ], for some finite θ < θ (if T is low). We
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conclude that if the equilibrium participation set Y∗ is an interval, then the equilibrium
success set Θ∗ must also be an interval.
Fix any interval success set Θ = [θ, θ]. The probability of success in equation (2)
can be written as:
pi(yi;Θ) = Φ
(
θ − βmH − (1− β)yi√
βσθ
)
−Φ
(
θ − βmH − (1− β)yi√
βσθ
)
. (6)
In this formula, βmH + (1− β)yi is the posterior mean of θ given yi and the hopeful
view, and βσ2θ is the posterior variance, where β ≡ σ2e/σ2y . It is straightforward to
observe that pi(yi;Θ) is hump-shaped in yi. This non-monotonicity is another key
feature of our model.
The distribution of income in the economy is normal with mean θ. Because indi-
viduals do not observe the true θ, each citizen has to infer the location of the center
of the distribution based on his own circumstances. Therefore, citizens tend to be-
lieve that they are close to the center of the distribution, i.e., people at the bottom of
society tend to overestimate their relative position in society, while those at the top
tend to underestimate their relative status. Citizens with a low yi think that θ is low,
and therefore most fellow citizens are similarly situated. They expect that the size
of participants (i.e., citizens with yi ∈ [y, y]) who attack the regime is small, and the
probability of success is small. Likewise, citizens with a high yi think that the center of
the distribution is near their own yi, which is to the right of the participation set [y, y].
They also believe that there will not be enough participants to achieve success. Only
the population of the intermediate segment attaches a high enough probability to the
event of a successful attack and is thus motivated to participate. We provide evidence
consistent with this mechanism in Section 4.
In sum, individuals care not only about the probability of success but also about
what difference success would make to their welfare. Under this construction, the
payoff from participation in collective action is low for poor agents because both α(yi)
and pi(yi;Θ) are low. The payoff is also low (or even negative) for rich agents because
14
yi
B
c
0
yˆY ∗
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(b) The A(θ; Y) function at Y = Y∗
Figure 1. The benefit function B(·;Θ) is single-crossing and hump-shaped when positive, given the
success set Θ is an interval. The size of attack A(·; Y) is hump-shaped, given the participation set Y is
an interval.
both pi(yi;Θ) and ρ(yi) are low. In other words, pessimism and the perceived low
chance of success override the potential gain from a new society and prevent the poor
from participating. The perceived low chance of success and the concern about poten-
tial downward mobility discourage well-off agents from upsetting the system. Only
a group of middle class citizens actively engages in this movement. They are hopeful
enough about the upcoming change of regime, sufficiently optimistic about the chance
of success, and expect upward mobility in their individual life chances.
LEMMA 1. Fix any non-empty interval success set Θ. The expected benefit from participat-
ing, B(yi;Θ), crosses zero once at yˆ and from above, is hump-shaped in yi when yi < yˆ, and
approaches zero when yi approaches −∞ or yˆ.
In Lemma 1, we prove (see the Appendix) that α(yi) is increasing, pi(yi;Θ) is hump-
shaped, and ρ(yi) is decreasing in yi. Moreover, each of these functions is log-concave
in yi when positive. Therefore, B(yi;Θ) is increasing then decreasing for yi < yˆ. This
shows that individuals with yi in the intermediate segment of the population distribu-
tion have the greatest incentive to participate in collective action. See Figure 1(a) for
an illustration.
A participation set Y∗ = [y, y] and a success set Θ∗ = [θ, θ] constitute a (non-
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degenerate) interval equilibrium of the model if and only if
B(y;Θ∗) = B(y;Θ∗) = c; (7)
A(θ; Y∗) = A(θ, Y∗) = T. (8)
Since B(·;Θ∗) and A(·; Y∗) are both hump-shaped, conditions (7) and (8) imply equi-
librium conditions (4) and (5). See Figure 1.
Let I = {[y, y] : y < y} ∪∅ be the set of all finite participation intervals (including
degenerate ones). Consider the following mapping f : I → I . For any participation
interval Y, solve the equation A(θ; Y) = T. If no solution exists or there is only one
solution, assign f (Y) = ∅; when there are two solutions, label them θ and θ and let
Θ = [θ, θ]. For such Θ, solve the equation B(yi;Θ) = c. If no solution exists or there
is only one solution, assign f (Y) = ∅; otherwise label the two solutions y′ and y′ and
assign f (Y) = [y′, y′]. An equilibrium participation interval Y∗ is a fixed point of f .
LEMMA 2. The mapping f is monotone according to the set-inclusion order, i.e., Y1 ⊇ Y0
implies f (Y1) ⊇ f (Y0).
Since the empty set ∅ is a fixed point of f , a degenerate interval equilibrium al-
ways exists in this model. If no one attacks the regime, then A(θ;∅) < T for any θ,
which implies that the set of successful states is empty. If the success interval is empty,
then B(yi;∅) < c for any yi, so no one attacks. It is also obvious that when the cost
of participation c is sufficiently high, the equation B(yi;Θ) = c has no solution for
any Θ, because the benefit from participation is bounded above. In that case, a de-
generate equilibrium is the only equilibrium. We next provide a proof that shows that
when participation costs c are low enough, there are indeed non-degenerate interval
equilibria.
PROPOSITION 2. For any T ∈ (0, 1), there is a critical value cˆ(T) such that non-degenerate
interval equilibria exist if and only if c ≤ cˆ(T).
Proof. Find a large enough finite participation interval Y˜ such that the upper boundary
16
of this interval is strictly less than yˆ and maxθ A(θ; Y˜) > T. Such Y˜ exists because
maxθ A(θ; Y˜) goes to 1 as the lower boundary of Y˜ goes to −∞. Let Θ˜ represent the
interval of θ for which A(θ; Y˜) ≥ T. Pick a sufficiently small c such that B(yi; Θ˜) > c
for any y ∈ Y˜. Such c exists because B(yi; Θ˜) is hump-shaped when yi < yˆ and
approaches 0 when yi approaches −∞ or yˆ. Recall that f (Y˜) is the set of yi for which
B(yi; Θ˜) ≥ c. By construction, we have f (Y˜) ⊃ Y˜. Let Ymax represent the interval of yi
for which α(yi)ρ(yi) ≥ c. Since α(yi)ρ(yi) > B(yi;Θ) for any finite success interval Θ,
we have Ymax ⊃ f (Y) for any Y. Therefore,
Ymax ⊃ f (Ymax) ⊃ f (Y˜) ⊃ Y˜.
Denote the restricted domain I∗ = {Y : Ymax ⊇ Y ⊇ Y˜}. Any element of I∗ is
a non-degenerate interval. Moreover, the partially ordered set (I∗,⊇) is a complete
lattice, with supremum Ymax and infimum Y˜. Since both f (Ymax) and f (Y˜) belong to
I∗, and since f is monotone, we have f (Y) ∈ I∗ for any Y ∈ I∗. In other words, f is a
monotone mapping from I∗ to I∗. By Tarski’s fixed point theorem, a fixed point of f
in I∗ exists.
Next, we show that if a non-degenerate interval equilibrium exists for some cˆ, then
a non-degenerate interval equilibrium exists for any c < cˆ. To see this, let Yˆ∗ be an
equilibrium participation interval when c = cˆ. Since f (Yˆ∗; cˆ) = Yˆ∗ and c < cˆ, we must
have f (Yˆ∗; c) ⊃ Yˆ∗. Moreover we have already established that Ymax ⊃ f (Ymax; c).
This means that for any c < cˆ, f (·; c) is a monotone mapping from I∗(c) to I∗(c),
where I∗(c) = {Y : Ymax ⊇ Y ⊇ Yˆ∗}. Tarski’s theorem guarantees the existence of a
fixed point of f (·; c).
Our approach to establishing the existence of interval equilibrium is different from
that of Morris and Shin (1998). Their method of showing the existence of monotone
equilibrium and eliminating non-monotone equilibria depends on the fact that the
ranking of agents by their expected benefit from participating is always monotone and
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invariant to any monotone strategy. In contrast, in our model, the ranking of agents
by their expected benefit is not monotone and is not invariant to their decision rule,
because the B(yi;Θ) function depends on the success set, or how agents coordinate.
2.3. Equilibrium multiplicity
To show that multiple non-degenerate equilibria exist in this model, we extend our
approach that establishes existence. Let Y∗ be the largest equilibrium participation
interval in the restricted domain I∗, defined in the proof of Proposition 2. We construct
another restricted domain I∗∗ such that each element in I∗∗ is a non-degenerate strict
subset of Y∗, and show that there exists another equilibrium in I∗∗.
To achieve this, we use the inverse mapping f−1 : I → I , defined as follows. Take
any participation interval Y. Find the success interval Θ such that {yi : B(yi;Θ) ≥
c} = Y. From the Θ so obtained, find the participation interval Y′ such that {θ :
A(θ; Y′) ≥ T} = Θ. Assign f−1(Y) = Y′ if a non-degenerate solution exists in each
step; otherwise assign f−1(Y) = ∅. Note that f−1 is monotone according to the set-
inclusion order. The proof of Proposition 2 implies that, for c < cˆ(T), there exists
some interval Ym such that Y∗ ⊃ Ym and f (Ym) ⊃ Ym. Because f−1 is monotone, the
latter is equivalent to Ym ⊃ f−1(Ym). We can also show that there always exists some
non-degenerate interval Yl such that f−1(Yl) ⊃ Yl. We choose Yl such that:
Ym ⊃ f−1(Ym) ⊃ f−1(Yl) ⊃ Yl.
This guarantees the existence of a fixed point of f−1 (and hence a fixed point of f ) in
I∗∗ = {Y : Ym ⊇ Y ⊇ Yl}.
PROPOSITION 3. For any T ∈ (0, 1), multiple non-degenerate interval equilibria exist if
c < cˆ(T).
While it is common for models with complementarities to exhibit multiple equilib-
ria, Proposition 3 implies that whenever a non-degenerate interval equilibrium exists,
there must be more than one of them (except in the non-generic case of c = cˆ(T)). To
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better understand this point, it is useful to reduce the dimensionality of the problem.
Because A(θ; Y) is symmetric about the point θ = (y + y)/2, in equilibrium we must
have θ+ θ = y+ y. Let q ≡ y− y represent the width of the participation interval and
let ω ≡ θ − θ represent the width of the success interval. Then, condition (8) can be
written as:
Φ
(
ω+ q
2σe
)
−Φ
(
ω− q
2σe
)
= T. (9)
Condition (7) can be written as:
B
(
y;
[y + y−ω
2
,
y + y +ω
2
])
= B
(
y;
[y + y−ω
2
,
y + y +ω
2
])
= c. (10)
Define g : [0,∞) → [0,∞) in the following manner. Fix q ≥ 0, and find the ω that
solves (9). Using such ω, find the y and y that solve (10). Assign g(q) = y − y if a
solution exists in each of these two steps; otherwise assign g(q) = 0. If [y, y] is an
equilibrium participation interval, y− y must be a fixed point of g.
Observe that there exists a q such that g(q) = 0 for all q ≤ q. If q is very small, the
associated ω that solves (9) is too small to provide sufficient incentive for any agent to
participate. When q goes to infinity, the associated ω also goes to infinity. However,
although the probability of success is one, the expected benefit is still hump-shaped
in yi when it is positive. Therefore, g(q) remains finite. These two facts imply that
g(q) is strictly below q both for q at q and for q sufficiently large. Therefore g(q) is
either completely below the 45-degree line, or there are multiple non-degenerate fixed
points. In the latter case, g(q) crosses the 45-degree line from below at the smallest
fixed point, and from above at the largest fixed point. See Figure 2.
To gain intuition, suppose that agents conjecture that the participation interval is
very small. As a result, they believe that it is impossible to have a sufficient number of
protestors to surpass the hurdle T and nobody participates. When they conjecture that
almost everybody participates, then the chance of success can be very high. However,
the very poor and the rich still find that it is not worth taking to the street. This is
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Figure 2. The mapping g(q) is below the 45-degree line when q (the width of the participation interval)
approaches q or ∞. When c < cˆ, g has more than one non-degenerate fixed point.
because B(·;Θ) is still hump-shaped, even when Θ is arbitrarily large. Further, given
the complementarities in action (that lead to Lemma 2), multiple non-empty equilibria
may arise, or when the cost is too high, only an empty equilibrium exists.
2.4. Non-interval equilibria, discontinuity, and comparative statics
So far, our analysis has focused on interval equilibria. Recall that when the partic-
ipation set is an interval, both the attack function A(·; Y) and the associated benefit
function B(·;Θ) are hump-shaped. The logic of strategic complementarity suggests
that other forms of equilibria are possible. For example, suppose that the participation
set Y consists of two non-overlapping intervals. Then, it is possible that the attack
function A(·; Y) may have two peaks (near the mid-points of the two participation
intervals). A twin-peaked A(·; Y) function may support a success set Θ that consists
of two non-overlapping intervals. Such a success set Θ may in turn produce a B(·;Θ)
that is twin-peaked in yi, so that two non-overlapping intervals of agents indeed have
the greatest incentive to participate.
PROPOSITION 4. The participation set in any non-interval equilibrium is strictly contained
in that of the largest interval equilibrium.
The equilibrium with the largest set of participants must be an interval equilibrium
and cannot be any other type. In other words, the largest interval equilibrium contains
all other equilibria, either interval or non-interval. The key logic underpinning this
result is similar to that in section 2.3 and it is the consequence of complementaries in
action, or precisely, the monotonicity of the mapping f . It provides an upper bound
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Figure 3. The participation interval Y∗ in the largest equilibrium shrinks (y∗ increases and y∗ decreases)
as the cost of participation c rises. The only equilibrium is the degenerate equilibrium when c exceeds cˆ.
for the size of a protest for any given θ and also implies that the very rich and the very
poor, who are distributed outside the largest equilibrium participation interval, would
never participate. Even when such equilibria exist, our central insight on the passivity
of the poor still survives.
PROPOSITION 5. In the largest equilibrium, both Y∗ and Θ∗ decrease (according to the
set-inclusion order) in c. Both sets have a strictly positive measure at c = cˆ(T) and change
discontinuously to an empty set when c exceeds cˆ(T). Further, cˆ(T) decreases in T.
Proposition 5 provides the comparative statics result for the cost of participation
c. Interestingly, the comparative statics exhibit discontinuity: the largest equilibrium
participation set shrinks (i.e., y rises and y falls) as c increases, until c reaches the
critical level cˆ, after which the interval equilibrium collapses and the degenerate equi-
librium becomes the only equilibrium. See Figure 3 for illustration. Clearly, the equi-
librium participation interval will not shrink continuously to an empty set when the
cost increases to the maximum of the expected benefit function. This is because the
benefit function B(yi;Θ) depends on the success interval Θ, which is endogenously
determined by (8). When the participation interval Y is small enough, the associated
success interval Θ is so small that the expected benefit of participating B(yi;Θ) is less
than c for any yi. Therefore, the participation interval implodes to an empty set.
Similarly, we can show that an increase in the critical mass for success T decreases
both Y∗ and Θ∗ in the largest equilibrium. Moreover, an increase in p1 − p0 increases
both Y∗ and Θ∗. The bigger is p1− p0, the smaller is the incentive to free ride. Because
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each agent expects a greater benefit from participating, the equilibrium participation
set and the corresponding equilibrium success set become larger.
An exogenous shift in the perceived average regime quality mH under the hopeful
world view affects the incentive to participate through three channels. First, for the
worst-off agents, α(yi) decreases in mH, because the discordance between what the
hopeful world view entails about regime quality and their own personal experiences
becomes greater if mH is higher. Second, those agents tend to believe that success is
more likely, because the quality of the regime θ has a higher chance of falling into the
success interval [θ, θ], according to their estimate. That is, pi(yi;Θ) may increase in
mH. For agents on the top, they may observe the opposite of these two effects. Third,
a higher mH implies that the reward from participation ρ(yi) in the hopeful world is
larger for anyone.
The combined net effect of these three mechanisms on the expected benefit is gener-
ally ambiguous. However, it can be the case that the effect of updating the world view
(the first channel) dominates the other two. Specifically, when mH rises, the lower
middle class find it even harder to believe that the mean regime quality is high. There-
fore, the expected benefit becomes smaller, despite the other two opposing effects. As
a result, the middle class at the lower end tend to drop out from protests; that is, the
lower boundary y of the participation interval increases. In contrast, the upper middle
classes find that a higher mH under the hopeful world view is more congruent with
their own personal experiences. This effect of updating the world view, together with
the higher reward for participation, dominates the effect of a possibly lower chance
of success. Therefore, the upper middle class are more inclined to participate; that is,
the upper boundary y for the participation interval increases. Moreover, interval equi-
libria collapse into a degenerate equilibrium with no attack as mH becomes too small.
Intuitively, when the reward for participation ρ(yi) is too low, nobody considers in-
volvement in social movements an attractive option. Therefore, everybody believes
that the chance of winning the battle is very low, which, in turn, justifies the quiescent
outcome.
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3. Generalization and Extension
3.1. A generalized model
We make three specific assumptions in the baseline case: (1) there are only two alter-
native worlds; (2) in the pessimistic world, the regime quality cannot be changed even
if the revolution is successful; and (3) the opportunity cost of participation depends
on one’s income only in so far as successful collective action brings about a reshuffling
of income. We show that the key results in our benchmark model still hold when we
relax this structure.
First, suppose that there is a continuum of possible world views, ranging from
extremely pessimistic to extremely hopeful. Each world is described by a normal dis-
tribution N(M, σ2θ ) from which the regime quality is drawn. Instead of assuming that
the mean quality of governance M is a two-point distribution with realisation mH or
mL, assume that agents possess a common prior belief of the distribution of M, which
is a normal distribution N(µ, σ2m), where µ is the mean of M, and σ2m captures the de-
gree of agents’ prior uncertainty over the possible world views. Each agent revises
his belief about the possible world views based on his own experience. The posterior
probability (density) that the world is M = m is:
α(yi, m) =
1√
γσm
φ
(
m− γµ− (1− γ)yi√
γσm
)
,
where γ = σ2y /(σ2y + σ2m). The expected probability of success in world m is denoted
by:
pi(yi, m) = Pr[A(θ) ≥ T|yi, M = m].
Second, assume that in each world m, when the collective action succeeds, a new
regime with quality θ′ drawn from N(m, σ2θ ) will replace the old one. All agents in the
economy are affected by the change in regime, but participants receive an extra reward
that is increasing in the new regime quality θ′ if the revolt is successful. Specifically,
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the extra gain from participation in a successful revolt in world m is:
ρ(m) = (p1 − p0)E[eθ′+e′i |yi, M = m] ≡ kem,
where k ≡ (p1− p0)e(σ2θ+σ2e )/2. Note that, in contrast to the baseline model, a new draw
of θ′ is taken upon successful collective action in all possible worlds, including the
relatively pessimistic worlds (where the average regime quality m is relatively low).
Since θ′ centers around m, the expected extra gain will be lower in more pessimistic
worlds and higher in more hopeful worlds. In those pessimistic worlds, successfully
removing the status quo and replacing it with a new regime does not bring that much
gain in expectation because the average quality of governance is low.
Third, agents’ cost of participation may depend directly on their economic status.
This may reflect considerations such as the time cost of taking action, or the income
loss resulting from reprisal by the regime. We let C(yi) = c0 + c1eyi represent the
cost of participation for agent i, where c0 > 0 is a fixed cost component and c1eyi is
a variable cost component with c1 > 0, which is higher for individuals with higher
income.
In this extended model, agents participate if and only if the expected benefit ex-
ceeds the cost:
B(yi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
α(yi, m)pi(yi, m)ρ(m)dm ≥ C(yi).
PROPOSITION 6. Given any finite success interval Θ, the benefit function B(yi;Θ) in
the extended model is hump-shaped in yi and approaches zero when yi approaches positive or
negative infinity. For any T ∈ (0, 1), a monotone equilibrium does not exist. However, there
exists a critical value cˆ0(T) > 0, such that non-degenerate interval equilibria exist for all
c < cˆ0(T).
Interval equilibria exist in this model because the benefit-cost ratio B(yi;Θ)/C(yi)
is hump-shaped in yi for any success set Θ that takes the form of an interval. Similar
to the benchmark model, cˆ0(T) cannot be too high and it is decreasing in T. Moreover,
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in this extended model, the mapping f is also monotone. Therefore, our key results
concerning the multiplicity of equilibria (Proposition 3), the comparison of interval
and non-interval equilibria (Proposition 4), and comparative statics and discontinuity
with respect to fixed cost (Proposition 5) are still valid.
3.2. Education
In the benchmark model, an implicit assumption is that agents only differ in income;
and income is determined only by the regime quality and personal luck. In reality,
individuals also differ in terms of occupation, human capital, and education, which
directly affect their income. In fact, economic status and education are among the most
important characteristics of the social identity of individuals: the underclasses are typ-
ically poorer and less educated, and the middle classes are usually richer and better
educated. In this section, we extend our benchmark model by allowing for human
capital as an additional determinant of agents’ incomes, so as to capture the positive
correlation between these two key characteristics. Moreover, this section also demon-
strates how the approach that establishes the interval equilibria in the benchmark case
can be extended to characterize models with multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
Specifically, we assume that the income of individual i is determined not only by
the regime quality θ and idiosyncratic experience ei, but also by his human capital or
education level hi, which is known to individual i. That is,
yi = θ + δhi + ei,
where δ > 0 can be interpreted as returns to human capital.17
In this setting, both yi and hi matter for agent i to update his world view, estimate
the likelihood of success in the hopeful world, and calculate the expected gain of par-
ticipation relative to standing by. Denote ri ≡ yi − δhi, which can be interpreted as
17In this extension, we assume that the human capital hi is exogenously given and independent of the
luck component ei. This assumption is reasonable in this static model. However, in a dynamic version
of this revolution game, the choice of education or human capital could be correlated with ei.
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the residual income after partialling out the known effect of human capital or educa-
tion. Since ri = θ + ei, an individual’s inferences about the quality of the regime and
about the quality of governance in general depends on ri but not on hi. Therefore, the
updated probability of the world being hopeful for agent i is α(ri) and his estimate
of the probability of success is pi(ri). However, the relative gain from participation,
(p1 − p0)E[eθ′+δhi+e′i − eri+δhi | ri, H] = ρ(ri)eδhi , is affected by the amount of human
capital. Therefore, the expected benefit of agent i can be written as:
B(ri, hi) = α(ri)pi(ri)ρ(ri)eδhi = B(ri)eδhi .
According to this formulation, for agents with the same residual income, on expec-
tation, the more educated ones benefit more from participating in collective action and
the change in the regime. Therefore, they have more incentive to participate. Accord-
ingly, it follows from the fact that, in this model, individuals with more human capital
have more to gain in a society with a higher quality of governance. This is largely
consistent with the empirical finding that educated individuals tend to participate in
political events.
In this extended model, for each particular level of human capital or education,
it is still the case that individuals with income in the middle range have the largest
incentive to participate in mass protest to push for a political change. The following
proposition formalizes this result. Specifically, let G(hi) be the cumulative distribution
function of hi, and let Y = {(yi, hi) : ai = 1} represent the set of individuals who
choose to participate.
PROPOSITION 7. If 1 − G(·) is log-concave, then for any c < cˆ(T), there exist non-
degenerate equilibria such that Θ∗ is an interval. The set of yi for which (yi, hi) ∈ Y∗ is an
interval, and this interval increases (in the sense of set-inclusion) as hi increases.
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4. Evidence for the Model Mechanisms and Implications
In this model, we rationalize the passivity of the poor and the activism of the mid-
dle class using two mechanisms. First, we characterize the attitudes of each class
toward social movements (i.e., the pessimism of the poor and the optimism of the
middle class) with Bayesian inferences under model uncertainty, and further explain
how these attitudes matter for their coordination in a collective action setting. Second,
we highlight that the poor tend to underestimate the chances of success, which also
prevents them from participating in social movements. In this section, we offer some
corroborating evidence for these mechanisms.
Regarding the effect of pessimism, our model specifies two links, i.e., from eco-
nomic status to beliefs, and from beliefs to action. The World Values Survey pro-
vides information about individuals’ beliefs or attitudes regarding governments and
politics. In one set of questions, the survey describes four types of governments to
respondents—having a strong leader, having experts make decisions, having the army
rule, and having a democratic political system—and then asks what they think about
each as a way of governing their country. If the respondents consider one or more
types of government to be good and the others bad, then this set of answers reveals
their political preferences. However, some people dislike all four types of government,
which likely means that they do not think governments can do any good and do not
believe that their countries can be made better off by changing the government. This
type of negative attitude towards governments and changes in politics is fairly close
to the notion of pessimism in our model. Therefore, we regard a respondent to be
pessimistic only if he views all four types of government as “very bad” or “fairly bad.”
In Table 2, we show regressions of a dummy variable for pessimistic on the income
group of the respondent, using the lowest income quintile as the omitted category.
Columns (1) and (2) of the table show that the coefficients for the higher income quin-
tiles are all negative and statistically significant, with or without controlling for per-
sonal characteristics (education, age, and sex). Moreover, the magnitudes of the coeffi-
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Table 2. Pessimistic View of Governance and Income Quintiles
pessimistic uninterested pessimistic × uninterested
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lowest Quintile 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1–20%)
Second Quintile −0.214∗ −0.301∗∗ −2.51∗∗∗ −4.49∗∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗
(21–40%) (−2.08) (−3.00) (−8.27) (−15.42) (−3.54) (−4.46)
Third Quintile −0.242∗ −0.424∗∗∗ −4.67∗∗∗ −8.60∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗
(41–60%) (−2.22) (−4.03) (−14.35) (−28.02) (−2.94) (−4.93)
Fourth Quintile −0.415∗∗ −0.675∗∗∗ −6.09∗∗∗ −11.8∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗
(61–80%) (−3.28) (−5.59) (−15.92) (−33.09) (−3.74) (−6.18)
Highest Quintile −0.467∗∗ −0.856∗∗∗ −7.52∗∗∗ −15.2∗∗∗ −0.524∗∗∗ −0.834∗∗∗
(81–100%) (−2.86) (−5.54) (−14.85) (−32.40) (−3.99) (−6.71)
demographic yes yes yes
characteristics
wave fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
country fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Waves 3–5 3–5 2–5 1–5 3–5 3–5
No. countries 82 83 85 86 82 83
No. observations 148140 151063 195217 214164 143587 146412
Demographic characteristics include education, age, and sex. Levels of statistical significance are indi-
cated by astericks (∗ for 5%, ∗∗ for 1%, and ∗∗∗ for 0.1%), and t-statistics are in parentheses. Source: World
Values Survey.
cients are larger for higher income quintiles, which implies that people tend to be less
pessimistic about governance in general when they enjoy a higher level of welfare in
society. It is consistent with our first model mechanism which maps economic status
to beliefs about the operation of the world, i.e., α(yi) is increasing in yi.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 use an alternative dependent variable to capture the
pessimistic world view. The World Values Survey asks the respondents how interested
they are in politics. We create a dummy variable uninterested, which takes the value of
1 if the response is “not very interested” or “not at all interested.” It is reasonable that
people show little interest in politics if they hold a pessimistic view of governance in
general and believe that changing governments will not bring real changes to society
and their own lives. We also consider a stricter definition in columns (5) and (6), which
requires both pessimistic and uninterested to be equal to 1. The results are similar to
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Table 3. The Degree of Pessimism and Participation in
Demonstrations
pessimistic = 1 pessimistic = 0
uninterested = 1 9.08% 11.57%
uninterested = 0 17.16% 21.54%
Data source: The third, fourth and fifth waves of the World
Values Survey, covering 80 countries from 1994 to 2007.
those in columns (1) and (2).
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that people who hold more pessimistic world
views about governance are less likely to participate in mass political action. This is
consistent with our second link which connects the beliefs of individuals to their ac-
tions. To establish the relationship between the degree of pessimism and the likelihood
of participation, we compute the fraction of participants among individuals who are
pessimistic only, uninterested only, both pessimistic and uninterested, or neither, by using
past participation in demonstrations as an indicator of political activism. The results
are reported in Table 3, after controlling for demographic characteristics, and country
and wave fixed effects. The fraction of participants in each group is statistically signif-
icantly different from the others, with the most pessimistic group being the least likely
to participate in demonstrations. The results are similar if we do not control for demo-
graphics. This finding is in line with our model predictions, and further validates our
constructed pessimism measures.
The second mechanism in our model is that the poor and the rich believe that the
chances of success are small, i.e., pi(yi;Θ) is low when yi is small or large in equilib-
rium. This follows from the fact that individuals, who use their own circumstances
to make inferences on the distribution of income in society tend to believe that they
are located near the median. This causes the poor to overestimate the size of the poor
population and the rich to overestimate the size of the population who are well-off.
Both groups underestimate the mass of middle-income individuals who will attack
the regime. Figure 4 illustrates this mechanism. In this figure, y˜i is the median of the
29
yi
yi
yiy y
y˜r
y˜m
y˜p
Figure 4. Poor, middle-income and rich citizens perceive that the distribution of well-being in society is
centered at different points, i.e., y˜p, y˜m and y˜r. The estimated size of protestors is largest if the center of
the distribution is perceived to be at y˜m.
distribution of well-being perceived by agent i. Since y˜i = E[θ|yi, H] in the hopeful
world, y˜i is increasing in yi. For example, a poor citizen tends to believe that the distri-
bution is centered near y˜p, while a rich citizen tends to believe that it is centered near
y˜r. Both believe that the mass of attackers (the shaded region) is small. However, a
middle-income citizen who believes that the distribution is centered near y˜m is more
optimistic about having a large number of like-minded middle-income citizens who
are prepared to attack the regime.
Data from the International Social Survey Programme provide information regard-
ing both the perceived relative position and the actual income of individuals, which
can be useful for corroborating the aforementioned mechanism in our model. The re-
spondents were asked to place themselves in an income decile of their own society,
where 10 represents the top ten percent and 1 the bottom ten percent. We also identify
to which income decile they actually belong in their own society, based on the actual
income that they reported and information regarding income distribution provided by
the World Income Distribution database.18 Figure 5 shows the average self-reported
relative position in each income group.
18Specifically, we use the 2009 wave of Social Inequality Survey in the International Social Survey
Programme for information on the actual income of the respondents. These income figures are con-
verted to actual income deciles based on the cutoff points available from the World Income Distribution
database.
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Figure 5. The average perceived relative position in each income decile group. The perceived relative
position is on average increasing in their actual income status but individuals from all of income groups
tend to believe that they are close to the median. Individuals at the lower and upper ends of the income
spectrum overestimate and underestimate their relative position, respectively. Source: International
Social Survey Programme and World Income Distribution database, covering 26 countries.
Although higher-income individuals tend to place themselves in higher income
deciles, it is evident from the figure that on average the lower-income group tend
to overestimate their relative position while richer individuals tend to underestimate
theirs.19 This evidence indicates that citizens do not have sufficient knowledge about
the actual income distribution and tend to believe that they are closer to the median
than they actually are.
In our model, the lack of information on actual income distribution is assumed.
In reality, such lack of knowledge may result from spatial segregation, which reduces
the availability of information to individuals, who typically can only update from a
sample of similarly situated people.20 This explanation is supported both empirically
and theoretically in Cruces et al. (2013) that demonstrate that the perception bias of
income distribution is indeed correlated with an individual’s relative position within
the reference group (proxied by area of residence).
19A regression analysis that we conduct with country fixed effects and various sets of controls also
confirms this pattern. Cruces et al. (2013) find the same pattern with survey data from Argentina.
20We thank one of the anonymous referees for offering this explanation.
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5. Model Interpretation and Alternative Hypotheses
Political aspiration. In our model, the middle class aspire and fight for a better society,
because they expect that such a goal is achievable through coordinated effort and that
they can benefit from it. The lower classes, struggling at the bottom of society, would
potentially have even more to gain but choose to standby, because they care little about
the likely impending changes. We demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that
this type of political aspiration is affected by economic status.
However, our theory of political aspiration can be interpreted more broadly. First,
economic status, such as income, can be considered as an approximation of the ex-
perience of individuals in society. Downtrodden individuals hold unfavorable views
about the possibility of real change, based on their own circumstances. This implies
that their interaction with individuals from other strata or more generally, new in-
formation about how the world operates, may change their local pessimistic beliefs.
That is actually one essential point made by Lenin in his influential political pamphlet,
What is to be Done?, in which he argues that to motivate the working class to take part
in political action, their political consciousness “would have to be brought to them
from without” (Lenin, 1988).
Second, some variant of our model can also be useful to shed light on mass move-
ments that push for political changes relevant to non-economic issues, such as polit-
ical rights or justice. The Hong Kong “Umbrella Movement” in 2014 is a good case
in point. The politically disadvantaged (mostly the poor) are inclined to hold a polit-
ically cynical views about how their country is governed, and remain skeptical about
what would be brought to them by political rights promised by the movement. More
generally, our theory can explain the contrast between the passivity of the poor and
activism of the middle class in many other political settings, such as voting, signing
petitions, and working for a political party.21 Consistent with our theory, this contrast
21For example, Jackson et al. (1998) empirically demonstrate that the poor are less inclined to vote in
elections and are more responsive to registration obstacles.
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may stem from the lack of desire and aspiration of lower class citizens, because they
perceive the political system as distant and unresponsive to their interests.
The theory of political aspiration that we put forth in this paper adds to the existing
literature on mass movements. However, while stressing its importance, we do not
claim that our theory is the only plausible explanation for this phenomenon. In the
reminder of this section, we discuss other hypotheses on the role that the middle class
play in modern polities and contrast these hypotheses with our theory to explicitly
highlight the key differences.
Modernization and economic interest. According to modernization theory (Lipset
1959), a growing middle class demands and serves democracy, which facilitates de-
mocratization, because this social stratum is more receptive to democratic values.
Barro (1999) offers evidence that there is a positive relationship between the size of the
middle class and the extent of democracy. However, Acemoglu and Robinson (2009)
argue that the middle class are driven mainly by economic interests in the process of
the creation and consolidation of democracy. In their framework, the middle class can
choose to side with the poor or the rich, depending purely on which action promotes
their economic interest.
Our work differs from these investigations and debates in two dimensions. First,
our focus is not on democratization in developing countries, but the phenomenon
of middle class activism, which is observed both in democratic and non-democratic
countries.22 As shown in the literature, the middle classes, although active in politics,
do not necessarily embrace democracy (Huntington, 1993; Chen and Lu, 2011).
Second, we specifically model how agents from different income groups coordi-
nate their actions and challenge the status quo, whereas the modernization theory
treats each income group as a single decision maker. It should be stressed that by in-
corporating the coordination features, our model can address a range of interesting
characteristics of mass movements. For example, our model can shed light on why
22We stress that the demands for higher quality governance and democracy are conceptually distinct.
We focus on collective action against the status quo that seeks for change, not necessarily democracy.
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middle class protests are usually sudden in timing and large in scale, see Section 2.4.
Education. The middle class are typically both economically better off and more
educated than the poor. In fact, economic status and education are two key charac-
teristics of the middle class. A popular idea concerning the observed middle class
activism is that people in this social stratum are more educated than the poor, and
educated individuals tend to be more politically involved. Therefore, the rise of the
middle class leads to greater political involvement among the masses and demand for
political change. Glaeser et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence for the conjecture
that education raises the perceived benefits of political participation.23
While acknowledging that this hypothesis is very reasonable, we focus on the other
characteristic of this social stratum and demonstrate how economic status affects po-
litical participation. This focus is justified, because we have shown empirically that the
political aspiration of individuals is related to their economic status, even when con-
trolling for the effect of education (see our discussion in Section 4). Our view is that
the theory offered in this paper and the education nexus are complementary, rather
than mutually exclusive. The complementarity of these dimensions is explicitly char-
acterized and highlighted in Section 3.2.
Disappointment and the tunnel effect. Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) outline a
hypothesis regarding the relationship between social mobility and political stability,
which may also shed some light on middle class activism. In a changing society, the
upper middle class, who have acquired a considerable amount of marketable skills,
may have risen in social status by accumulating wealth. However, they remain disap-
pointed since they may encounter obstacles in many other social dimensions, which
frustrates their continued ascent. The lower middle class, who have similar skills, may
initially derive satisfaction from observing their peers rise in status, but then lose their
earlier hope and turn to the enemies of the status quo when they do not advance as
23On the one hand, Glaeser et al. (2007) show that individuals acquire civic skills through education,
which facilitates their participation in politics. On the other hand, Kam and Palmer (2008) show that
education may be a proxy for cognitive skills. Both mechanisms imply that more educated individuals
tend to be more politically involved.
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much as they expect (the tunnel effect).
This hypothesis essentially argues that disappointment of the middle class may
lead to action against the existing order, based on the implicit behavioral assumption
that clamoring their disappointment is a necessary action for them. In contrast, we
demonstrate that the middle class may expend costly effort in demanding change, be-
cause they are hopeful and optimistic, or in other words, they believe that the changes
are both beneficial and likely, while the poor are inactive because they do not believe
that the new regime would deliver anything substantially better and collective action
is unlikely to be successful. More importantly, we rationalize the formation of such
beliefs for each individual with Bayes’ rule and build an explicit connection from eco-
nomic status to beliefs and to participation choices.
Psychological attribute. The flip side of the activism of the middle class is the passiv-
ity of the poor. Both Huntington (1968) and Fukuyama (2013) hypothesize that there
are behavioral differences between the poor and the middle class. They argue that the
poor do not care about politics because they are concerned mostly about day-to-day
survival. However, that observation should be the result of the political passivity in-
stead of the cause. If the poor believe that changes in politics brought about by mass
movements can significantly improve their life quality, it would be most natural for
them to participate, given that the opportunity costs are low and the potential benefits
are high. Fukuyama (2013) also argues that the failure of governments to meet the
expectations of the middle class leads to their collective action against authorities, but
does not explain why this social stratum, instead of the poor, hold such high expecta-
tions for the quality of governance.
Our paper can be seen as an attempt to provide a rationale for the pessimism of
the poor instead of just postulating it as a behavioral or psychological attribute. Such
a theoretical foundation is useful because it helps explain, among other things, why
the size of the middle class affects their optimism, or why people who used to be
politically quiescent when they were poor become active when their economic status
35
improves.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we rationalize the pessimism of the poor and the hopefulness of the
middle class with model uncertainty, and provide evidence to corroborate our model
mechanisms. Although our theory is formalized in an environment of political econ-
omy, a substantial extension of our work can potentially contribute to the economics
literature on the behavior of the poor and the poverty trap. One line of this develop-
ment economics literature is based on the hypothesis that the poor, who live under
scarcity, may make very different choices from the non-poor. This view is labeled as
“poor but behavioral” (Ghatak 2014). A variant of the mechanism that we put forth in
this paper to explain the political pessimism of the poor can be extended to rationalize
their “economic pessimism.” The poor, who receive bad outcomes from their market
participation, may make negative inferences about the opportunities that the market
offers, which further causes the lack of information and their poverty. In other words,
poverty leads to pessimism, which, in turn, reinforces it.
Our work also explicates how individuals with heterogeneous beliefs about the un-
derlying structure of the game coordinate in taking collective action, thereby enriching
the literature on coordination games by adding model uncertainty. We also develop a
workable approach to establishing the existence and multiplicity of interval equilibria,
which can be applied to coordination games with similar features.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The function B(yi;Θ) has a single-crossing from above because
ρ(yi) > 0 if yi < yˆ and ρ(yi) < 0 if yi > yˆ. It goes to 0 when yi approaches−∞ because
limyi→−∞ α(yi) = 0; and it goes to 0 when yi approaches yˆ because B(yˆ;Θ) = 0 and
B(·;Θ) is continuous. Finally, it is straightforward to verify from equations (1) and
(3) that α(yi) is log-concave and ρ(yi) is log-concave when positive. For pi(yi;Θ), we
rewrite equation (6) as:
pi(yi;Θ) =
∫ θ−βmH√
βσθ
θ−βmH√
βσθ
φ
(
t− 1− β√
βσθ
y
)
dt
=
∫ +∞
−∞
1− β√
βσθ
φ
(
1− β√
βσθ
(y− t)
)
I(t)dt,
where the indicator function I(t) is equal to 1 if t ∈ [(θ− βmH)/(1− β), (θ− βmH)/(1−
β)] and is equal to 0 otherwise. Since φ(·) and I(·) are both log-concave, their con-
volution is log-concave (Prekopa-Leindler inequality) as well. Therefore, B(yi;Θ) =
α(yi)pi(yi;Θ)ρ(yi) is log-concave when positive, which implies that it is increasing
then decreasing for y < yˆ.
Proof of Lemma 2. If f (Y0) = ∅, then the result is trivially true. Assume f (Y0) 6= ∅,
and consider Y1 ⊇ Y0. It is obvious that A(θ; Y1) ≥ A(θ; Y0) for any θ. Because A(θ; Y)
is hump-shaped, an upward shift in this function lowers the smaller root and raises
the larger root to the equation A(θ; Y) = T. Denote the respective solutions to the
inequalities A(θ; Y1) ≥ T and A(θ; Y0) ≥ T by Θ1 and Θ0. We have Θ1 ⊇ Θ0.
A wider success interval raises the estimated probability of success for every agent.
Thus, B(yi;Θ1) ≥ B(yi;Θ0) for any yi < yˆ. Since B(yi;Θ) is hump-shaped, the respec-
tive solutions to the inequalities B(yi;Θ1) ≥ c and B(yi;Θ0) ≥ c, denoted Y′1 and Y′0,
satisfy Y′1 ⊇ Y′0.
Proof of Proposition 3. Observe that α(yi)ρ(yi) is hump-shaped in yi. Denote yP ≡
argmaxyi α(yi)ρ(yi) and c ≡ α(yP)ρ(yP). Further, observe that pi(yi; [yi − ω/2, yi +
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ω/2]) is also hump-shaped in yi and attains a maximum at mH for any width of success
interval ω > 0.
Claim 1. For any c < c, there exist yB and ωB such that B(yi; [yB − ωB/2, yB +
ωB/2]) attains its maximum at yB and the maximum value is equal to c. Further, yB is
between yP and mH.
Proof. Define B˜(yi,ω) ≡ B(yi; [yi −ω/2, yi +ω/2]). For any ω > 0, this function is
hump-shaped in yi and attains a maximum at some y∗(ω), which is between yP and
mH. The function B˜(y∗(ω),ω) is strictly increasing in ω. Further, it approaches 0 when
ω approaches 0, and goes to c when ω approaches ∞. Therefore, for any c < c, there
exists an ωB such that B˜(y∗(ωB),ωB) = c. Let yB ≡ y∗(ωB), then the claim is shown.
Claim 2. For any c < c, there exists an arbitrarily small interval Yε such that
f−1(Yε) ⊃ Yε.
Proof. We pick Yε = [yB − ε, yB + ε] for some small ε > 0. Let Θε satisfy {yi :
B(yi;Θε) ≥ c} = Yε. By construction, Θε contains the interval [yB −ωB/2, yB +ωB/2]
and is arbitrarily close to this interval when ε approaches 0. Therefore, the mid-point
of Θε can be made arbitrarily close to yB. Let Y′ε satisfy {θ : A(θ; Y′ε) ≥ T} = Θε. The
mid-point of Y′ε and that of Θε must be the same, since A(·; Y′ε) is symmetric about
the mid-point of the interval Y′ε . Therefore, the mid-point of Y′e can be also made
arbitrarily close to yB. For any T ∈ (0, 1), Y′ε must have a strictly positive measure,
but the measure of Yε can be made arbitrarily small. Therefore, for ε sufficiently small,
Yε collapses around the mid-point of Y′ε . As a result, we have Y′e ⊃ Yε, and the claim
follows.
For c sufficiently small, we can always find a Y˜ such that it contains the interval
between yP and mH and f (Y˜) ⊃ Y˜. That is because mH is always smaller than yˆ and
f (Y˜) is arbitrarily close to the half interval (−∞, yˆ] when c is very small. Then such a
Y˜ will satisfy Y˜ ⊃ Yε for small ε. Therefore,
Y˜ ⊃ f−1(Y˜) ⊃ f−1(Yε) ⊃ Yε.
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The second inequality holds because the mapping f−1 is monotone; the last inequality
is implied by Claim 2.
Denote the set of intervals I∗∗ = {Y : Y˜ ⊇ Y ⊇ Yε}. Any element of I∗∗ is a non-
degenerate interval. Moreover, the partially ordered set (I∗∗,⊇) is a complete lattice,
with supremum Y˜ and infimum Yε. Since both f−1(Y˜) and f−1(Yε) belong to I∗∗, and
since f−1 is monotone, we have f−1(Y) ∈ I∗∗ for any Y ∈ I∗∗. In other words, f−1 is
a monotone mapping from I∗∗ to I∗∗. By Tarski’s fixed point theorem, a fixed point
of f−1 in I∗∗ exists.
Together with Proposition 2, this argument implies that there exists some small c′
such that multiple non-degenerate equilibria exist for c ≤ c′. Let Y∗ denote the largest
non-degenerate equilibrium participation interval and Y∗∗ denote a smaller one when
c = c′. By definition, Y∗ ⊃ Y∗∗.
Let Yl = f (Y∗∗; c′ + η). For small η, Yl is non-degenerate. Because f (Y; c) is de-
creasing in c for any Y, we have f (Y∗∗; c′) = Y∗∗ ⊃ Yl = f (Y∗∗; c′ + η). Let Ym denote
the largest equilibrium participation interval when c = c′ + η + ξ < cˆ, where ξ > 0.
We have f (Ym; c′ + η) ⊃ Ym = f (Ym; c′ + η + ξ). For η + ξ sufficiently small, Ym is
sufficiently close to Y∗ and thus Ym ⊃ Y∗∗ ⊃ Yl. Therefore,
Ym ⊃ f−1(Ym; c′ + η) ⊃ f−1(Yl; c′ + η) ⊃ Yl.
Using a similar logic as before, a fixed point of f−1(·; c′ + η) exists in I∗∗ = {Y : Ym ⊇
Y ⊃ Yl}. Moreover, the proof of Proposition 2 establishes a fixed point of f (·; c′ + η)
exists in I∗ = {Y : Ymax ⊇ Y ⊇ Ym}. Therefore, f has at least two non-degenerate
fixed points for any c ≤ c′ + η.
Proceeding iteratively by replacing c′ + η for c′, this argument can be repeated for
any c′ < cˆ. Thus, f has at least two non-degenerate fixed points whenever c < cˆ.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since B(yi;Θ) approaches 0 for yi very low and is negative
for yi > yˆ, both the participation set and the success set must be unions of non-
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overlapping finite intervals. Suppose there is a non-interval equilibrium (Y∗n ,Θ∗n). Let
Y∗n = ∪J1j=1[yj, yj] and Θ∗n = ∪J2j=1[θ j, θ
j
], where J1 and J2 are positive integers and
yj < yj+1 and θ j < θ j+1.
Consider the participation interval Y0 = [y1, yJ1 ] and the success interval Θ0 =
[θ1, θ
J2 ]. We have:
A(θ1; Y0) > A(θ1; Y∗n ) = T,
A(θ J2 ; Y0) > A(θ
J2 ; Y∗n ) = T;
where the inequality follows from Y0 ⊃ Y∗n , and the equality follows because θ1 and θ J2
are on the boundary of the equilibrium success set Θ∗n. Although A(θ; Y∗n ) may not be
hump-shaped in θ, A(θ; Y0) is hump-shaped as Y0 is an interval. Therefore, if Θ′ is the
set of θ for which A(θ; Y0) ≥ T, the two inequalities above imply that Θ′ ⊃ Θ0 ⊃ Θ∗n.
This, in turn, implies:
B(y1;Θ′) > B(y1;Θ∗n) = c;
B(yJ1 ;Θ′) > B(yJ1 ;Θ∗n) = c.
Recall that f (Y0) is given by the set of yi for which B(yi;Θ′) ≥ c. Therefore, we must
have f (Y0) ⊃ Y0. As in the proof of Proposition 2, there exists at least one fixed point
of f in the domain I∗ = {Y : Ymax ⊇ Y ⊇ Y0}. Any fixed point in this domain is larger
than Y0, and is therefore larger than Y∗n .
Proof of Proposition 5. Let (Y1,Θ1) and (Y2,Θ2) be the largest equilibria when the
costs are c1 and c2, respectively, with c1 < c2 < cˆ. Since B(yi;Θ2)− c strictly decreases
in c for any yi, we have f (Y2; c1) ⊃ f (Y2; c2) = Y2. Thus, f (·; c1) has a fixed point in
the set I∗ = {Y : Ymax ⊇ Y ⊇ Y2}, which implies that Y1 ⊃ Y2. Furthermore, since
A(θ; Y1) > A(θ; Y2) for any θ, we have Θ1 ⊃ Θ2.
The second part of the proposition follows from the fact that f (Y; T) is decreasing
in T for any Y. Let Yˆ∗ be a fixed point of f when the threshold is T and when c = cˆ(T).
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Then, for a lower threshold T′ < T, we have f (Yˆ∗; T′) ⊃ Yˆ∗. A fixed point of f (·; T′)
exists in I∗ = {Y : Ymax ⊇ Y ⊇ Yˆ∗} when the threshold is T′ and when c = cˆ(T). This
implies cˆ(T′) ≥ cˆ(T).
Proof of Proposition 6. Since α(yi, m) is the density function of a normal distribution
with mean γµ+ (1− γ)yi and variance γσ2m, we have:
α(yi, m)ρ(m) = keγµ+(1−γ)yi+γσ
2
m/2 1√
γσm
φ
(
m− (γµ+ (1− γ)yi + γσ2m)√
γσm
)
,
which also takes the form of a normal density. Therefore, for any θ0,
∫ ∞
−∞
α(yi, m)ρ(m)Pr[θ ≤ θ0 | yi, M = m]dm
= keγµ+(1−γ)yi+γσ
2
m/2Φ
θ0 − βγµ− (1− βγ) yi − βγσ2m√
βσ2θ + β
2γσ2m
 ,
where we make use of the fact that E[Φ(aX + b)] = Φ(b/
√
1+ a2) when X is a stan-
dard normal random variable. This expression goes to 0 as yi goes to negative infinity,
while C(yi) goes to c0 > 0 as yi goes to negative infinity. Therefore, the very poor
never participate. There is no monotone equilibrium in the extended model.
Take any interval success set Θ = [θ, θ]. The benefit function B(yi;Θ) is equal to:
keγµ+(1−γ)yi+γσ
2
m/2
×
[
Φ
(
θ − βγµ− (1− βγ)yi − βγσ2m√
βσ2 + β2γσ2m
)
−Φ
(
θ − βγµ− (1− βγ)yi − βγσ2m√
βσ2 + β2γσ2m
)]
.
This function is log-concave in yi, and goes to 0 as yi approaches positive or negative
infinity. The cost function C(yi) is log-convex, and is bounded away from 0. This
implies that the function B(yi;Θ)/C(yi) is increasing then decreasing. If c0 is greater
than some critical value cˆ0, the equation B(yi;Θ)/C(yi)− 1 = 0 has no solution; if c0
is lower than that critical value, it has two solutions. The proof of the existence of an
interval equilibrium for c0 ≤ cˆ0 follows the same steps as in Proposition 2.
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Proof of Proposition 7. The key to the proof is to show that there exist equilibria in
which Θ∗ is a non-empty interval. Consider any success interval Θ. Since B(ri)eδhi is
quasi-concave in (ri, hi), the set R ≡ {(ri, ti) : B(ri;Θ)eδhi ≥ c} is convex. Let hˆ(ri) be
the minimum hi that satisfies B(ri;Θ)eδhi ≥ c. If no such hi exists, define hˆ(ri) to be the
highest hi in the support. Since the level set is convex, the function hˆ is convex. Given
the set R, the mass of attackers can be written as:
A(θ; R) =
∫ ∞
−∞
[
1− G
(
hˆ(ri)
)]
φ
(
ri − θ
σe
)
1
σe
dri.
To show that A(θ; R) is hump-shaped, the following two facts are sufficient. First,
A(θ; R) approaches 0, when θ goes to +∞ and −∞. Second, A(θ; R) is log-concave,
which follows from the log-concavity of 1− G(hˆ(ri)) and φ(·). To see this,
d2 log[1− G(hˆ(ri))]
dr2i
= −
(
g
1− G
)′(dhˆ
dri
)2
− g
1− G
d2hˆ
dr2i
< 0.
This inequality holds because the hazard rate is increasing if 1− G(·) is log-concave
and because hˆ(·) is convex. Therefore, we may construct a mapping which takes an
interval Θ and solve for the convex set R that satisfies B(ri;Θ)eδhi ≥ c, and from such
R solve for the interval Θ′ that satisfies A(θ; R) ≥ T. Following the same logic as the
proof of Proposition 2, we can show that a fixed point of this mapping exists for c less
than some critical value cˆ. Further, if t′ > t, then (ri, t) ∈ R∗ implies (ri, t′) ∈ R∗.
Given the definition of ri, the proposition follows.
Heng Chen, The University of Hong Kong
Wing Suen, The University of Hong Kong
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